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majorityss that Fried leveled at the court of appeals. Indeed, each 
dissent employs strong language in characterizing the course of the 
abortion decisions.s6 
If the law is increasingly shaped in the appellate courts-espe-
cially the Supreme Court-and if an attorney general wishes to pur-
sue an activist agenda seeking changes in the law, the appellate 
business of the Department of Justice will inevitably play the key 
role in advancing the agenda. Thus it was under President 
Roosevelt and thus it was under President Reagan. No one should 
be surprised that this substantive agenda has been pursued at a cost: 
the loss of some able advocates from government service, the deteri-
oration of procedural regularity within the Department, and the 
loss of some of the luster of the Office of the Solicitor General. 
It should be stressed, however, that these costs seem to have 
brought the Reagan administration few of the gains it sought. Ar-
guably a less tendentious approach to its agenda might have been 
more successful, while costing less. One hopes that the costs are 
only temporary; much depends on the new solicitor general and at-
torney general. 
THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE-
GATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950. By Mark V. Tushnet.1 
Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press. 
1987. Pp. xiv, 166. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $9.95. 
John Cary Sims 2 
Are you ready to read more about the School Desegregation 
Cases? You probably thought that you had this topic well in hand 
after reading Richard Kluger's Simple Justice, the chapter in Ber-
nard Schwartz's Superchief dealing with Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, and Dennis Hutchinson's ambitious article.3 Maybe you've 
even kept up with the recent firelight between Philip Elman and 
55. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814. 
56. E.g., Chief Justice Burger ("undermines" limitations of Roe "astonishingly"; ren-
ders them "shallow rhetoric"), id. at 782-84; Justice White ("nonsensical," "mysterious" 
findings, "linguistic nit-picking," "bafiling," "inexplicable," "warped," and "tortuous"), id. 
at 802-14; and Justice O'Connor ("major distortion," "mischaracterizes," "dangerous extrav-
agance"), id. at 814-29. 
I. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. 
3. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 
1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. I (1979). 
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Randall Kennedy about the role played by the Department of Jus-
tice in the cases,4 and a law clerk's recollections about the delibera-
tions which eventually led Justice Reed to join the rest of the Court 
in repudiating the "separate but equal" doctrine.s It would be rea-
sonable to wonder whether many readers need or want to know 
more about the School Desegregation Cases than can be learned by 
reading these and other works. 
Professor Mark Tushnet's book nonetheless provides a valua-
ble supplement to the literature about Brown. His principal focus is 
on events that prepared the ground for Brown rather than on that 
case itself. Prior to the direct attack on school segregation, the 
NAACP had devoted its resources to three more limited classes of 
desegregation suits: those seeking to desegregate the graduate and 
professional schools at public universities; those attempting to 
equalize the salaries of black and white teachers; and those chal-
lenging inequality of physical facilities at black and white elemen-
tary and secondary schools. Professor Tushnet describes in great 
detail the planning and execution of this earlier litigation, so that 
readers will appreciate the significance of the NAACP's decision in 
1950 to change direction and tackle head-on the legality of all segre-
gation in public education. 
To a greater degree than previous studies of Brown, this book 
"was written from the perspective of the national office of the 
NAACP," primarily on the basis of NAACP papers which have 
been transferred to the Manuscript Division of the Library of Con-
gress.6 Not only are the source materials (other than published 
court decisions) mostly drawn from the NAACP's files, but 
Tushnet consistently views the desegregation campaign from the in-
stitutional perspective of the NAACP. Thus, there is a detailed ex-
amination of how the money was raised to support the litigation, 
how the legal staff was selected, how the cases to be litigated were 
identified, how the NAACP's central staff and the local attorneys 
assisting them developed and presented their legal theories, and 
how disagreements among the staff and between the staff and other 
segments of the black community on strategy were resolved. Every 
4. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1987); Kennedy, A Reply to Philip 
Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987); Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987). 
5. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. The Board of Education, 1986 SUPREME 
CoURT HISTORICAL SociETY Y.B. 48. 
6. In 1939, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. was established as a 
corporate entity distinct from the NAACP. However, untill957 the "Inc. Fund" served as a 
subsidiary of the NAACP, and therefore there is no need to distinguish between the two 
organizations in this review. See NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 
753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021-22 (1985). 
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lawsuit has this sort of underbrush, but it is rare for such matters to 
be exposed to public view. Tushnet speculates that this is because 
"information is available about the practice of public interest law 
that is in general not available about the practice of law on behalf of 
corporations and individuals." As a rule, attorneys representing 
private parties, even in litigation of great moment, do not make sim-
ilar documents public-don't plan on going down to the Library of 
Congress any time soon to look over Cravath, Swaine & Moore's 
files on United States v. IBM. It is rare for even a public interest 
litigation campaign to be so amply documented and open to public 
view, and therefore Tushnet's careful sifting of the records is espe-
cially valuable to anyone interested in how an important and inter-
esting group of interrelated cases was handled by dedicated and able 
attorneys. 
Tushnet's book is unusual in another respect: it treats litiga-
tion as a social process that "begins well before a lawsuit is filed and 
ends well after a judgment is entered." Tushnet describes public 
interest litigation as a process which begins when a group of people 
"discover that they agree that something is wrong," and continues 
through their efforts to find counsel and prosecute their claims, up 
to a resolution of the claims by the courts, and beyond. Even after 
judgment, the process often continues, as "the locus of controversy 
shifts from the courts to the legislatures, as prevailing plaintiffs seek 
more effective relief, or as losing plaintiffs seek to get some relief 
from someone." 
From his exhaustive study of the NAACP's litigation cam-
paign, Tushnet attempts to draw conclusions about public interest 
litigation in general. This effort focuses on several issues. Tushnet 
states that prior chroniclers of the Brown litigation, most notably 
Richard Kluger, have succumbed to the temptation to "see the out-
come as the obvious product of plans that had been laid many years 
before." While recognizing the "manifest virtues" of Simple Jus-
tice, Tushnet believes that it "is flawed by the dramatic unity that 
its style gives to the story. The novelist's talents suggest that each 
small item in the story contributed in an important way to the 
larger outcome, and the journalist's talents simplify a complex real-
ity to make it easier to understand." Tushnet attributes a larger 
role to "chance-unexpected events or decisions by individuals 
outside of the movement-and choice-decisions by insiders to pur-
sue one path rather than another that in retrospect seems almost 
equally sensible." Tushnet notes, moreover, that the choices made 
by the individuals controlling a given piece of litigation are affected 
by their own preferences and personalities. He concludes that, 
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within the wide boundaries set by the NAACP's determination to 
attack white supremacy, the organization's efforts were not system-
atic or strategic. Instead, it "attacked what might be called targets 
of opportunity." 
The "targets of opportunity" approach is more sensible than it 
may sound. It would be foolish to adopt a long-term litigation 
strategy that required an organization to eschew a promising case 
simply because it had not been anticipated. Reformist lawyers need 
to keep their minds open, while recognizing that some spur-of-the-
moment cases should be declined. The NAACP's litigation cam-
paign provides examples of both self-restraint and aggressive litiga-
tion of the "damn the torpedoes" variety. For example, the 
organization did not pursue a possible suit in North Carolina on 
behalf of an applicant to medical school who had scored very poorly 
on the aptitude examination. On the other hand, it did represent 
Lloyd Gaines in his efforts to attend the University of Missouri Law 
School, even though the staff feared that he was not a suitable plain-
tiff. Those fears turned out to be justified, since the victory Gaines 
won in the Supreme Court could not be implemented because the 
plaintiff had dropped from sight and could not be located by his 
attorneys. 
Tushnet mulls over two other issues pertinent to all public in-
terest litigation, on which the NAACP's desegregation campaign 
might shed light. One is the degree to which the NAACP lawyers 
were free of control by their clients in designing and implementing 
the direct attack on segregated education. He concludes that the 
attorneys "could not have imposed, and did not need to impose, 
decisions on their clients." Tushnet argues that the NAACP could 
not win its lawsuits without strong support from the black commu-
nity for which it claimed to speak, and that the actual clients which 
the organization represented in particular cases were strong-willed 
individuals motivated primarily by idealism rather than individual 
self-interest-the sort of person who is least likely to defer to an 
attorney. 
Tushnet also tries to determine whether the shape of the 
NAACP's litigation campaign was more a product of what was go-
ing on inside the NAACP or of the broader social developments 
occurring in the United States between the early 1930s and 1950. 
He concludes that the "role of organizational factors seems signifi-
cantly more important than that of variations in the general social 
environment." "[B]y the time the campaign became a major effort, 
it had developed its own dynamic. . . . [E]conomic and political 
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developments had no more than a rough connection to what oc-
curred during the litigation campaign." 
In my view, the narrative elements of the book are an unquali-
fied success. Tushnet is careful and straightforward, and his story 
sustains its momentum despite the fact that the nature of the mate-
rial inevitably leads to some dense passages. Gaines, Sipue/, Sweatt, 
and McLaurin, along with a number of less prominent cases, are 
fleshed out in a way that contributes a great deal to our understand-
ing of the desegregation campaign. 
Tushnet's effort to draw general principles out of the 
NAACP's experience is ambitious and well-handled, but may in the 
end confirm the suspicion that every major case (and every litiga-
tion campaign) is so nearly unique that any effort to generalize 
(even a careful and imaginative one like Tushnet's) is doomed to fall 
short. To his credit, Tushnet himself emphasizes the temptations to 
which an historian is prone. A jumbled, chaotic, and somewhat ar-
bitrary series of events, through the lens of hindsight, may seem to 
reveal a clear and steady line of development heading toward a con-
clusion which is seen as virtually inevitable. By identifying the false 
starts, errors, and other setbacks which at times deflected or 
delayed the school desegregation campaign, Tushnet injects a 
healthy dose of reality into a story which can easily be streamlined 
and distorted by our knowledge of how Brown was decided. 
Tushnet is also right to stress the large role played in litigation 
by chance, by personalities, by the characteristics of the organiza-
tions involved, and even by geography. For example, he tells us 
repeatedly that much of the NAACP's early school litigation was 
conducted in Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia (rather than 
in the Deep South) primarily because those areas were often more 
accessible to the NAACP's attorneys. Maryland was, in addition, 
the "home ground" of Thurgood Marshall, who played the lead 
role in the desegregation campaign, and for that reason, among 
others, it became one of the NAACP's preferred venues for litiga-
tion. No litigator would question the importance of such seemingly 
mundane considerations, and I suspect that close examination of 
other litigation would confirm that accidents of geography have 
often affected choices of where to litigate. I know, for example, that 
the Commonwealth of Virginia has, over the past fifteen years, been 
drawn into more than its fair share of test-case litigation because it 
is such a short drive from the Washington, D.C. office of the Public 
Citizen Litigation Group to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia. 
The role of chance in litigation, while significant, is usually dif-
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ficult to disentangle from other determinants of success. Opportu-
nities for false inferences abound. For example, like many 
attorneys, I generally prefer to prosecute federal constitutional 
claims in the federal courts, in the belief that on balance state courts 
will be less receptive to such claims. 1 Yet, on occasion, I have taken 
over constitutional litigation which has already been initiated in 
state courts and carried it forward, since it could not be refiled in 
federal court without suffering substantial delay or some other det-
riment. While I was pleased when the state courts ruled for my 
clients in those cases, my confidence in my ability to select the most 
favorable forum was badly shaken: my clients could have done no 
better-and might have done worse-in the federal courts. If I had 
been able to litigate in federal court and we had ultimately won, I'm 
sure that to this day I would believe that my seemingly astute fo-
rum-shopping was one of the reasons for our success. A historian 
reviewing the litigation would probably agree, especially after talk-
ing to mel 
The biggest question in any history of litigation is likely to be, 
"Why did the case tum out as it did?" While this inquiry can be 
interesting on its own terms, one hopes that the historian will pro-
vide an answer with implications for other litigation strategists. It 
is in pressing for a satisfactory explanation of the NAACP's success 
that Tushnet takes on his most difficult task, and it is on that score 
that the book is most disappointing, at least to those of us with a 
strong practical interest in public interest litigation. His short an-
swer to the question of "Why victory?" is: "Thurgood Marshall." 
Having recounted the process by which the NAACP moved from 
its program of "equalization" suits to an all-out attack on segrega-
tion, Tushnet observes: 
Marshall had preferred the direct attack from the start, and between 1945 and 1950 
there were essentially no legal developments making it more sensible to begin the 
attack in 1950 than it would have been in 1945. But Marshall deferred the decision 
from a time when it would have seriously split the NAACP to a time when the 
external environment, in politics and legal doctrine, and the internal politics of the 
organization made it easier for others to agree that what Marshall wanted was in 
their interest too. Marshall's strength had always resided in his superb judgments 
about life and law, rather than in his ability to construct a legal argument. The way 
in which the direct attack decision was made shows him at his best. 8 
My disappointment with the interpretive component of Profes-
7. See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). 
8. Along the same line, Tushnet states that "the extraordinary character of Thurgood 
Marshall played a crucial part" in achieving favorable settlements in the suits in which black 
teachers sought salaries equal to their white counterparts, since "Marshall was a charismatic 
figure in the black community" and thus able to convince the black teachers to hold firm in 
the negotiations. 
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sor Tushnet's book should not be taken as necessarily reflecting any 
disagreement with his conclusion. Thurgood Marshall unquestion-
ably made an enormous contribution to the successful outcome of 
the litigation campaign, in conjunction with the other able and dedi-
cated attorneys for the NAACP. From my perhaps narrow per-
spective as a litigator, however, attributing victory to the lawyer is 
too much like attributing it to luck: it's interesting to know why 
things turned out the way they did, but the answer, even if correct, 
is of little or no assistance to lawyers planning the next litigation 
campaign. 
Be that as it may, Tushnet has written a fine book: solid, fasci-
nating, and instructive.9 For those who contemplate similar 
projects, I have one final suggestion: We need studies of unsuccess-
ful constitutional campaigns. There is a natural tendency to write 
about victories rather than defeats. Yet our understanding of suc-
cess can never exceed our understanding of failure. Wouldn't it be 
fascinating to read a book, as thorough and intelligent as Tushnet's, 
about Bowers v. Hardwick, the daring but unsuccessful challenge to 
state laws making homosexual sodomy a crime? "Comparative liti-
gation" might be as instructive as comparative law. 
9. Judge Robert L. Carter of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York has recently leveled a number of harsh criticisms at Professor Tushnet's book. 
Carter, Book Review, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1083 (1988). Judge Carter's reactions are especially 
important because he participated in the events described in the book as a staff attorney for 
the NAACP. In my view, the tension between the theories set out in the Tushnet book and 
those advanced by Judge Carter is not nearly as great as the Judge's review would make it 
appear. For example, Judge Carter states that "contrary" to Professor Tushnet's view, "the 
national office [of the NAACP] took a stand against any form of segregation [in 1950] and led 
its local constituency to accept that view." Jd. at 1089-90. I do not believe that Professor 
Tushnet disagrees. ("It is true that the choice between equalization and direct attack was 
postponed from 1945, when the issue surfaced, to 1950 .... The delays were used to prepare 
the organization for the direct attack decision that Marshall preferred all along.") Judge 
Carter also states that "Professor Tushnet seems to believe that if the NAACP had lowered 
its sights and pressed for equal facilities, whites might have been more sympathetic and suc-
cess more likely." Jd. at 1091. I read Tushnet as supporting the appropriateness of the direct 
attack strategy. I believe that Judge Carter and Professor Tushnet are in agreement that, 
while the education received by blacks today may be no better than the education they would 
be receiving under a system of separate-but-really-equal schools, the separate-is-not-equal 
principle of Brown provided the impetus for much broader efforts to achieve equal treatment 
for blacks, such as through civil rights legislation, in addition to removing a major source of 
humiliation and stigma. 
